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Abstract: Good management models and good models for understanding biology differ in basic philosophy. 
Management models must facilitate management decisions despite large amounts of uncertainty about the 
managed populations. Such models must be based on parameters that can be estimated readily, must explic-
itly account for uncertainty, and should be simple to understand and implement. In contrast, biological mod-
els are designed to elucidate the workings of biology and should not be constrained by management con-
cerns. We illustrate the need to incorporate uncertainty in management models by reviewing the inadequacy 
of using standard biological models to manage marine mammals in the United States. Past management 
was based on a simple model that, although it may have represented population dynamics adequately, failed 
as a management tool because the parameter that triggered management action was extremely difficult to 
estimate for the majority of populations. Uncertainty in parameter estimation resulted in few conservation 
actions. We describe a recently adopted management scheme that incorporates uncertainty and its resulting 
implementation. The approach used in this simple management scheme, which was tested by using simula-
tion models, incorporates uncertainty and mandates monitoring abundance and human-caused mortality. 
Although the entire scheme may be suitable for application to some terrestrial and marine problems, two fea-
tures are broadly applicable: the incorporation of uncertainty through simulations of management and the 
use of quantitative management criteria to translate verbal objectives into levels of acceptable risk. 
Incorporacion de la Incertidumbre en Modelos de Manejo para Mamiferos Marinos 
Resumen: Los modelos buenos de mane.io y los modelos buenos para el conocimiento de la biologia difieren 
en su filosofia basica. Los modelos de manejo pueden facilitar las decisiones de manejo a pesar de la gran 
cantidad de incertidumbre sobre las poblaciones manejadas. Estos modelos pueden estar basados en 
parametros que pueden ser facilmente estimados, la mayoria considera explicitamente la incertidumbre y 
deberian ser simples de en tender e implementar. En contraste, los modelos biologicos son disefiados para elu-
cidar el funcionamiento de la biologia y no son restringidos por asuntos de manejo. En este trabajo ejempli-
ficamos la necesidad de incorporar la incertidumbre en los modelos de manejo mediante la revision de la in-
competencia en el uso de modelos biologicos convencionales en el manejo de mamiferos marinos en los 
Estados Unidos. En el pasado el manejo se basaba en un modelo simple que a pesar de poder representar las 
dinamicas poblacionales adecuadamente, fallaba como una herramienta de manejo debido a que el 
parametro que desencadenaba las acciones de manejo era extremadamente dificil de estimar para la may-
oria de las poblaciones. La incertidumbre en la estimacion de parametros resulto en pocas acciones de con-
servacion. Describimos un esquema de manejo recientemente adoptado que incorpora la incertidumbre y su 
implementacion resultante. La metodologia usada en este esquema simple de manejo, el cual ha sido pro-
bado usando modelos de simulacion, incorpora la incertidumbre y determina el monitoreo de la abundan-
cia y la mortalidad causada por humanos. A pesar de que el esquema completo puede ser adecuado para 
aplicarse a problemas tanto terrestres como marinos, pocas caracteristicas son ampliamente aplicables: la in-
§ email taylor@caliban.ucsd.edu 
Paper submitted September 2, 1999; revised manuscript accepted April 5, 2000. 
1243 
Conservation Biology, Pages 1243-1252 
Volume 14, No.5, October 2000 
1244 Incorporating Uncertainty in Management Models Tayloret al 
corporaci6n de la incertidumbre mediante simulaciones de manejo y el uso de criterios cuantitativos de 
manejo para traducir objetivos verbales en niveles aceptables de riesgo. 
Introduction 
The primary goal of a management model is to use data 
to make decisions that result in meeting management 
objectives. Management objectives are usually defined 
by law, regulation, or some management body such as a 
fisheries council or a recovery team. For example, the 
primary objective of the u.s. Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (1972) is to maintain populations above a certain 
level. Yet after more than 20 years of management under 
this act, and despite declines in the abundance of some 
populations, only a few populations received any con-
servation action. The history of management using a bio-
logical model demonstrates that ignoring uncertainty re-
sults in failure to take needed conservation actions. We 
contrast this history with the current management 
model, proscribed in the 1994 amendment to the act, 
which explicitly incorporates uncertainty to rectify past 
inadequacies. The marine mammal example shows how 
a rarely implemented law can be turned into a function-
ing and proactive law through appropriate consider-
ation of uncertainty. Another important feature of the 
new management scheme is that, prior to being written 
into law and regulations, it was tested by simulation of 
the management process. Our purpose is not to provide 
the details of the actual model and testing procedure, 
which have been published elsewhere (Taylor 1993; 
Wade 1998), but to provide the history of the develop-
ment of a management model and emphasize that the 
new management scheme functions well largely be-
cause of the explicit treatment of uncertainty. 
Management has failed in the past not because the 
model driving management actions did not adequately 
represent population dynamics but rather because the 
law was interpreted to require proof that populations 
were in a certain state ("depleted") before actions were 
taken. At an international level, at least part of the blame 
for the spectacular overexploitation of the great whales 
can be placed on scientists being unable to agree on pa-
rameters used in simple models to drive management 
decisions: there was no clear way to treat uncertainty. 
For brevity, we detail the evolution of management 
models for marine mammals within the United States, 
but a similar evolution has taken place in models devel-
oped by the International Whaling Commission (Cooke 
1994). We then describe the current management 
model and how it differs in basic philosophy from mod-
els that scientists typically use to understand biological 
processes. 
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The 1972-1993 Model for Marine Mammal 
Management in the United States 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) contains two 
primary objectives: to maintain populations (1) above their 
optimum sustainable population level (aSP) and (2) as 
functioning elements of their ecosystem. The first objective 
was defmed by the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS; Gehringer 1976) as a population with abundance 
exceeding the maximum net productivity level (MNPL). 
The MNPL was defined as the population size that would 
yield ". . . the greatest net annual increment in population 
numbers or biomass resulting from additions to the popula-
tion due to reproduction and/or growth less losses due to 
natural mortality." In theory, management action was es-
sentially binary: no kills of marine mammals were allowed 
if population abundances fell below MNPL-formally clas-
sified as "depleted" under the MMPA-and no manage-
ment actions were required for populations above MNPL. 
The problem was in estimating both what MNPL was and 
where the population was in relation to MNPL. 
The concept of MNPL follows from the generally agreed 
principle that marine mammal populations experience 
density-dependent population growth. For example, a com-
monly used simple model (Pella & Tomlinson 1969; Gilpin 
et al. 1976) that represents density-dependent growth is 
N t + 1 = Nt + RMAxN{1 - (~ f), (1) 
where N is abundance, t is time, RMAX is maximum pop-
ulation growth rate, K is carrying capacity, and e is the 
shape parameter. The MNPL is determined by K and e. If 
e = 1, then equation 1 is a standard logistic equation 
with a linear decrease in growth between N = 0 and N = 
K, and MNPL = 0.5 K 
Numerous theoretical papers have attempted to quantify 
MNPL as a proportion of carrying capacity for long-lived 
mammals (Goodman 1981; Fowler 1984; Fowler 1988; 
Gerrodette & DeMaster 1990; Taylor & DeMaster 1993). 
For example, Taylor and DeMaster (1993) examined com-
binations of density-dependent changes in age-specific 
birth and death rates and found it likely that MNPL is be-
tween 50% and 85% of carrying capacity. 
Results of 1972-1993 Management Model 
Of the 153 stocks (62 species) of marine mammals un-
der U.S. management, assessments that in some way at-
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Table 1. Marine mammal stocks for which an attempt was made by the National Marine Fisheries Service to assess status relative to the 
maximum net productivity level (MNPL) prior to 1994. 
Stocks" 
Number 
of stocks Method/) StatusC Source 
Eastern tropical Pacific dolphins 
(spotted, spinner, common, striped) 
Gray whale 
9 back-calculation D(2) Smith 1979, 1983; Wade 
1993a, 1993b, 1994 
back-calculation, no Reilly 1981; Gerrodette 
dynamic response & DeMaster 1990 
Bowhead whale 1 back-calculation E Breiwick et al. 1981 
North Pacific small cetaceans 
(Pacific white-sided dolphin, 
northern right whale dolphin) 
Harbor porpoise (California) 
2 back-calculation no Hobbs & Jones 1993 
back-calculation no Barlow & Hanan 1995 
Boveng 1988a, 1988b, 1988c; 
California pinnipeds (northern 
elephant seal, California sea lion, 
harbor seal) 3 
2 
1 
dynamic response no Boveng et al. 1988 
Steller sea lion decline >50% E,T Merrick et al. 1987 
Northern fur seal decline >50% D York 1987 
Bottlenose dolphin (Atlantic coast) 
Total 
strandings D Scott et al. 1988 
21 
aStocks on this list had a documented analysis (source) that attempted to determine population status relative to MNPL. Not all assessments had 
conclusive results. Scientific names not previously mentioned in the text: spotted dolphin (Stenella attenuata), common dolphin (Delphinus del-
phis), striped dolphin (Stenella coeruleoalba), bowhead whale (Balaena mysticetus), Pacific white-sided dolphin (Lagenorhynchus obliquidens), 
Northern elephant seal (Mirounga angustirostris), California sea lion (Zalophus californianus), harbor seal (Phoca vitulina), bottlenose dolphin 
(Tursiops truncatus). 
b Back-calculation, calculating pre-exploitation size from estimates of recent abundance and annual estimates of human-caused mortality; dy-
namic response, analysis of observed dynamics (Goodman 1988); decline >50% observed trend indicating a decline in abundance of greater 
than 50%; strandings, analysis of an anomalous stranding event. 
CStatus is D for stocks designated as depleted under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA); E or r,l()r stocks listed as endangered or 
threatened under the ESA (and thus automatically considered depleted under the MMPA); or no for stocks not listed under the MMPA or ESA. 
tempted to determine status relative to OSP were com-
pleted for 21 stocks over 21 years (Table 1). In U.S. 
waters (i.e., excluding eastern tropical Pacific dolphins), 
only 8% (12 of 153) of the stocks were assessed. We 
equate the definition of stock with management unit, 
which is essentially a unit-usually geographically delin-
eated-defined to meet specified management objectives 
(for further discussion, see Moritz 1994; Taylor 1997). 
Attempts to directly estimate MNPL were made for only 
two species: spinner dolphins (Stenella longirostris; Smith 
1984) and northern fur seals (Callorhinus ursinus; 
Ragen 1990). Ragen (1990) emphasized that MNPL could 
not be estimated reliably even for the largest available 
data set (northern fur seals). Reilly (1992) made the same 
point for California gray whales (Eschrichtius robustus), 
which are the best-known population of baleen whales. 
Attempts to estimate population level relative to MNPL 
(without actually estimating MNPL itself) were made for 
17 stocks (Table 1), but few of these stock assessments 
were successful in unambiguously determining whether 
the stock was depleted. In addition, indirect methods, 
such as observed declines in abundance of over 50% were 
used to define three stocks as depleted without need for 
further consideration of population level relative to 
MNPL (Table 1). Only four stocks are currently desig-
nated depleted without also being listed under the U.S. 
Endangered Species Act, and only six other stocks 
(excluding eastern tropical Pacific dolphins) were for-
mally assessed to see whether management actions were 
needed. We review two case studies to illustrate the 
management lessons learned during this period. 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Dolphins 
The case of tropical dolphins killed by tuna fishing illus-
trates the amount of data required before populations 
could be listed as depleted. In 1969 the first reports of 
high mortality of dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific 
tlma purse-seine fishery (Perrin 1969) triggered a pro-
gram to estimate total mortality (Lo & Smith 1986). In-
creased observer coverage in the early 1970s confirmed 
that mortality was high, which prompted dolphin abun-
dance estimation surveys beginning in 1977. Several of 
the dolphin populations were estimated to be below 
MNPL (Smith 1983) based on abundance estimates (Holt 
& Powers 1982), mortality estimates for 1959-1979, and 
assumptions about likely population growth rates. Dis-
putes, including litigation from the tuna industry, about 
the uncertainty of several of the inputs into those analy-
ses led an administrative law judge to reject such deple-
tion designations (Marine Mammal Commission 1982). 
Conclusive analyses sufficient to justify the depleted sta-
tus of these populations (Wade 1993a, 1993b) required 
a tremendous amount of data: nine abundance surveys 
over 12 years, 17 years of relative trend indices from 
data collected on the tuna vessels, 25 years of observer 
Conservation Biology 
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data on dolphin mortality rates in the fishery, and 34 
years of data on fishing effort. The requirement to show 
conclusive proof led to a listing delay of 14 years from 
the first abundance survey and an estimated 23-year de-
lay from the date of depletion (Wade 1994). 
International management and industry actions in the 
early 1990s (Joseph 1994) led to a dramatic decline in 
the levels of dolphin mortality. These management ac-
tions were not clearly related to designation of the 
stocks as depleted under the MMP A. 
Harbor Porpoise in California 
In the mid-1980s, increasing numbers of stranded harbor 
porpoise (Phocoena phocoena), along with an expand-
ing coastal gillnet fishery in central California, indicated 
that the population of harbor porpoise in the region of 
the fishery may have been at some risk. A fishery ob-
server scheme was instituted to estimate the number of 
animals being killed, and surveys were conducted to es-
timate abtmdance. In an attempt to determine whether 
the population was depleted, the abundance of porpoise 
in earlier years was back-calculated using data on fishing 
effort and kill rates (Barlow & Hanan 1995). Uncertainty 
in many parameters made determination of status rela-
tive to MNPL impossible. Nevertheless, approximately 
10% of the population was being killed annually, and 
porpoise populations cannot grow fast enough to re-
place such large annual losses (Barlow & Boveng 1991), 
so it was tmlikely that the fishing mortality could be sus-
tained by the local population. A larger population exists 
in northern California, but the extent of mixing between 
the local central California population and this northern 
California population was and is unknown. The poten-
tial problem of excessive kills was solved for the harbor 
porpoise not by MMP A actions but rather by actions un-
der the Endangered Species Act to protect sea otters 
(Enhydra lutris) being killed in the same fishery, which 
closed so many areas that fishing became largely unprof-
itable. Again, the well-intentioned but unworkable former 
MMP A management scheme failed to protect its in-
tended target. 
Lessons from the 1972-1993 Experience 
Although some management actions were taken during 
the MMPA's first 20 years, few were triggered by the 
mathematical model that defmed depletion. Actions that 
were taken involved highly publicized issues such as the 
tuna-dolphin problem, in which hundreds of thousands 
of animals were taken in a concentrated fishery. Manage-
ment actions resulted primarily from political pressure 
associated with problems that could be observed readily. 
Most fisheries had no monitoring of marine mammal 
Conservation BiolobTy 
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mortality, and there were no abundance estimates for 
the vast majority of species. For species other than the 
few with a long time series of both kills and abundance 
(northern fur seals, eastern tropical Pacific dolphins, 
and gray whales), estimation of current status relative to 
historical numbers proved an impossible task. We also 
learned that using trends in abundance was a risky strat-
egy for most cetacean species for which estimates of 
abundance are imprecise. Taylor and Gerrodette (1993) 
noted in reference to the vaquita (Phocoena sinus), an 
endangered porpoise, that the species is likely to go ex-
tinct before a statistically significant trend can be deter-
mined. 
We have learned that we can estimate three things 
fairly well: abundance, its associated precision, and mor-
tality rates. Because many marine mammal populations 
are recovering from overexploitation, we also have nu-
merous estimates of population growth rates that are 
probably close to the maximal rates. What was needed, 
then, was a management system that (1) was based on a 
model that used data we could gather, (2) incorporated 
uncertainties in the data, and (3) facilitated management 
decisions in a timely manner. In other words, we sought 
a management system that could be implemented and 
that could survive legal scrutiny. Further, a system was 
needed that could be easily explained to constituents in 
the environmental and fishery communities as well as to 
politicians and administrators who cannot be expected 
to be well versed in population dynamics. 
The Current Model for Marine 
Mammal Management 
Recognizing that the previous management regime was 
not working, in 1998 the U.S. Congress placed a morato-
rium on most MMPA provisions that dealt with fishery 
mortality and asked scientists at the NMFS and U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service to propose a new management 
scheme. The Marine Mammal Commission (Robert Hof-
man, testimony to Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 14 July 1993) defined the fol-
lowing objectives for marine mammal management: (1) 
maintain the fullest possible range of management op-
tions for future generations, (2) restore depleted species 
and populations of marine mammals to optimtilll sustain-
able level with no significant time delays, (3) reduce takes 
(kills) to as near zero as practicable, and (4) as possible, 
minimize hardships to commercial fisheries while achiev-
ing the previous objectives. These objectives are based on 
the precautionary principle of Holt and Talbot (1978): 
"Management decisions should include a safety factor to 
allow for the facts that knowledge is limited and institu-
tions are imperfect," and "The magnitude of the safety 
factor should be proportional to the magnitude of risk. " 
Taylor et al. 
The new management regime grew out of proposals 
from the NMFS, the Marine Mammal Commission, fish-
ing groups, and environmental organizations. It sought 
to do three things: (1) to explicitly consider uncertainty 
in management, (2) to base management on parameters 
that could be estimated, and (3) to provide incentives to 
gather better data. This regime, now part of the 1994 
amendments to the MMP A, requires that total annual hu-
man-caused mortality and serious injury be less than po-
tential biological removal (PBR), as follows: 
(2) 
where, N;\lIN is minimum population estimate, RMAX is max-
imum population growth rate, and FR is recovery factor. 
Behind the model is a simple idea: humans should not 
remove more than the population needs to maintain at 
least half of its current carrying capacity (K) (or, if K 
has been constant, historical numbers). To get an intui-
tive grasp of the PBR management scheme, consider an 
analogy of shooting at a target. Instead of a bullseye, the 
target is a square with a horizontal line bisecting the 
midpoint. For any given shot at the target, the goal is al-
ways (i.e., with high probability) to place your round 
above the line. This symbolizes maintaining populations 
above MNPL. Imagine that you want to make certain 
when you shoot that you hit above a line 95% of the 
time. Now consider two guns: a pilgrim's musket and a 
sniper's rifle. The rifle shoots with great precision and is 
equivalent to an abundance estimate with a very low co-
efficient of variation (CV). Even an expert marksman, how-
ever, would be considerably less precise with the musket: 
repeated attempts with the musket result in a more diffuse 
pattern than with the rifle. To ensure a high probability of 
hitting the target above the line, the marksman would de-
liberately aim the musket higher than the rifle. 
Using NMIN in the PBR equation effectively raises the 
aiming point to adjust for poorer precision in the abun-
dance estimates. The amount above the line the marks-
man needs to aim depends on the number of shots be-
low the line deemed acceptable. In management terms, 
how often can we fail to meet the management objec-
tives and still consider the result acceptable? This is 
where the balance is struck between contradicting 
goals, such as keep populations at safe levels while mini-
mizing hardship to fisheries. The translation between 
policy and science is achieved by defining specific quan-
titative objectives called performance criteria, so called 
because they are the performance standard for the 
model. This not only allows uncertainty to be incorpo-
rated but sets the management scheme in an explicit 
framework of acceptable levels of risk. Thus, parties that 
assert that the scheme is over- or underprotective must 
argue for different levels of acceptable risk rather than 
about the details of the science. Uncertainty can no 
longer be used as a reason for inaction. 
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Three performance criteria were used for this manage-
ment scheme: (1) populations recovering from depletion 
(taken to be 30% K) will have a 95% probability of be-
ing above MNPL in 100 years; (2) healthy populations 
(2:MNPL) will have a 95% probability of remaining above 
MNPL after 20 years; and (3) populations at high risk 
(taken to be 5% K) will have a 95% probability of not de-
laying the time to reach MNPL by > 10% over a zero human-
caused kill scenario. All these criteria, like a population via-
bility analysis, frame performance in terms of a certain 
probability of an event occurring in a given amount of time. 
The performance criteria define for the marksman 
(modeler) how often shots must be placed above the line. 
This is accomplished in two steps by tuning the model to 
achieve the desired performance. The first step treats un-
certainty related to imprecision in the abundance data. 
Consider the performance of criterion #1 that requires 
populations depleted to 30% of K to reach MNPL in 100 
years. Simulations start with the initial population at 30% of 
K and "manage" the populations by simulating abtmdance 
N.%'N = Best estimate lV,'c.liN = 20th percentile 
0.9 a c 
CV = 0.8 
0.1 
0.9 b d 
:oc CV" 0.2 CV = 0.2 
'0 0.7 
'" 0 
""5 
<:'I:l 0,5 U= 
0.3 
0.1 
Year Year 
Figure 1. Thirty sample trajectories of populations recov-
ering from a depleted level of 0,3 K. In each case, the sig-
moidal curve shows the expected trajectory with no hu-
man-caused mortalities, and the horizontal line at 0.5 K 
shows the management objective of the maximum net 
productivity level. All cases use equation 2 with RM4X = 
0.04 (cetaceans) and FR = 1.0 (no biases). Parts a and b 
assume NMIN is the mean (best) abundance estimate 
(assuming the estimates are log-normally distributed). 
Parts c and d use the lower twentieth percentile of the 
abundance distribution as NM1N. 
Conservation Biology 
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estimation, fisheries removal, and population growth for a 
range of plausible scenarios. For example, dolphin popu-
lations typically have a maximum growth rate of 4% per 
year and abundance estimates with coefficients of varia-
tion around 0.2. Sample trajectories for simulations vary 
(Fig. 1) because sometimes abundance is over- or under-
estimated, resulting in allowed kills that vary accordingly. 
Different percentages of the abundance estimate (N;\1IN) 
are used, and the performance is measured by the propor-
tion of time the population is 2':MNPL after 100 years. The 
percentage used for NMIN is the one that results in the ob-
jective being met 95% of the time, which occurred at the 
lower twentieth percentile (Figs. lc & Id). 
The simulations clearly show that accounting for un-
certainty by using a lower percentile is precautionary, 
whereas the typical practice of the best estimate is not 
(Fig. 1). Figures la and Ib use the "best" abundance esti-
mate for NMIN in equation 2, and Figs. lc and Id use the 
lower twentieth percentile of the abundance estimate dis-
tribution for N;\1IN' Using the "best" estimate manages less 
well-known populations (with lower precision abundance 
estimates) less conservatively (contrast Figs. la & Ib; 
see also Taylor 1993). Using a lower percentile of the 
abundance, in contrast, manages less well-known popu-
lations more conservatively (Figs. lc & Id). The reason 
that populations in Fig. lc achieve on average a higher 
abundance than those in Fig. Id is because the allowed 
kill is smaller. A fishery wishing to improve this situation 
may well request that more precise data are gathered. 
Thus, simply incorporating the uncertainty related to 
the precision of the abundance estimate met two man-
agement goals: increasing the margin of safety commen-
surate with the level of our ignorance of the population 
and providing an incentive to gather more precise data. 
The second step in tuning the model is to address un-
certainty caused by bias. Returning to the marksman 
analogy, bias would be indicated if shots aimed at a tar-
get consistently missed in one direction. If the sights are 
improperly adjusted, the marksman may aim above the 
line but consistently hit below it. The correction is to 
tlme the sights. 
We addressed this uncertainty using a second parameter, 
the recovery factor (FR ). Mter tuning the model to ac-
count for imprecision, we ran a second set of simulations 
to tune for potential biases in the key parameters: abun-
dance, human-caused mortality, and maximum growth 
rate. For example, one scenario considered was overesti-
mating the abundance by a factor of two. Such an over-
estimate could come from the relatively unlikely event 
of animals being attracted to the survey vessel or, more 
likely, from animals being included in the abundance es-
timate which were really part of another population. As 
a simple example, consider an exploited population of 
1000 animals living adjacent to an unexploited popula-
tion of equal size. Because we often cannot see popula-
tion boundaries in the marine realm, these populations 
Conservation BiolobTy 
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are accidentally treated as a single management unit. 
The result is that a kill is allowed that is about twice as 
high as it should be. The possibility of such errors led to 
the setting of default values for FR such that 95% of the 
simulated populations equilibrated within OSP despite 
such errors. If the possible factors that cause bias are elim-
inated, this parameter could be raised to a value of one, 
but, doing so would dramatically reduce the safety margin 
for managing the species (Taylor 1997). 
The final parameter in equation 2 is RMAX . Using data 
from recovering populations, conservative default val-
ues were chosen when data were lacking or uncertain: 
0.04 for whales and dolphins and 0.12 for seals and sea 
lions. Of course, data from the species or population of 
concern are used whenever available. Details of the sim-
ulations and rationale for default values are given by 
Wade (1998). 
The result of including estimates of precision in calcu-
lating the PBR is that the expected equilibration level in-
creases as the CV of the abundance estimate increases 
(the precision decreases) (Fig. 2), which is necessary to 
ensure meeting management goals with less precise 
data. The point where the PBR lines intersect the net 
productivity curve is the level at which the population is 
expected to equilibrate. 
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Figure 2. Net productivity and potential biological re-
moval (PER) for different levels of abundance/carrying 
capacity (N/K) with the same scale. Populations would 
be expected to equilibrate at the intersection point be-
tween the lines for PER and the net productivity curve. 
These PERs do not include the safety factor (FR), which 
would reduce PERs to half for threatened or depleted 
stocks or stocks with unknown population structure or 
to one-tenth for endangered species. Maximum net pro-
ductivity level (MNPL) is assumed to be at 0.5 K (verti-
cal line). The objective is to keep populations above 
MNPL, which would then be called optimum sustain-
able populations (OSP) (horizontal arrow). 
Taylor et al. 
We have addressed treatment of scientific uncertain-
ties, but in management the uncertainty in the imple-
mentation of a management scheme cannot be over-
looked. The PBR management scheme flags populations 
that may be experiencing unsustainable mortality and 
gives a target level of acceptable mortality. The PBRs are 
calculated for each stock by federal government scien-
tists and are presented in stock assessment reports. 
These reports are reviewed by three regional "scientific 
review groups," bodies of nonfederal scientists repre-
senting perspectives of state agencies, academia, fisher-
ies, and environmental groups, who make recommenda-
tions on research priorities and the adequacy of the data 
used. Stocks for which estimated fishery-caused mortal-
ity exceeds PBR are termed strategic. Regulations are 
not automatically imposed on fisheries when kills ex-
ceed the PBR. Instead, data are scrutinized for the poten-
tial that biases can be reduced by improving abtmdance 
estimates or stock definitions. Several species originally 
listed as strategic have been removed from the list as 
dedicated research was conducted to correct for sus-
pected biases. If, however, the data are sound and fisher-
ies contribute significantly to mortalities in strategic 
stocks, a "take reduction team" is formed. The team, 
composed of fishers, environmentalists, state and federal 
government representatives, and scientists, is charged 
with the task of recommending means to reduce the kills 
(take) to levels at or below PBR within 14 months subse-
quent to the finalization of the stock assessment reports. 
Results of Current Management Model 
Mter the first year of implementation (1994), stock as-
sessment reports were written for 153 stocks in U.S. wa-
ters, and PBRs were published for 89 stocks (Barlow et 
al. 1995a; Blaylock et al. 1995; Small & DeMaster 1995) 
(Table 2). For 22 additional stocks, PBRs were not pub-
lished but either an approximate PBR level or a lack of 
evidence for any human-caused mortality allowed the 
stock to be classified, resulting in 112 out of 153 stocks 
(73%) being assessed. Kills exceeded PBR for 24 stocks 
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of marine mammals. Although some of these, such as 
harbor porpoise in the Gulf of Maine, were known to be 
at risk before the management scheme was instituted, 
many were species that had received no attention in the 
past. Chief among these were species of whales that 
spend long periods of time beneath the surface, includ-
ing sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus) and nu-
merous beaked whales (Family Ziphiidae). 
The stock assessment reports reveal both stocks that are 
at risk and gaps in what we need to know to manage prop-
erly. Comprehensive surveys off the Pacific and Atlantic 
coasts were completed in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Be-
cause the law mandates monitoring, surveys are planned 
to continue on a rotational schedule. Testing of the scheme 
has also made clear the importance of understanding pop-
ulation structure and genetic sampling, which are becom-
ing an integral part of survey design. Knowing the spatial 
distribution of kills allows formulation of stock boundary 
hypotheses needed to interpret genetic data (Taylor & Di-
zon 1996; Taylor 1997). Take reduction teams have been 
formed, and research is tmderway to develop techniques 
to reduce the number of marine mammals killed in fisher-
ies to as near zero as is practicable. 
Comparisons between the Models 
The fundamental problem when management involves 
potentially limiting human-caused mortality is determining 
the acceptable level of kill. The old model attempted to do 
this by determining the status of the population relative 
to K The model failed as a management technique and 
provided little improvement in our scientific under-
standing of marine mammal biology. Recognizing our in-
ability to estimate MNPL for most species, we turned to 
using trends in abundance as an indicator of population 
health. Using trends has two important limitations. First, 
the burden of proof is nearly always to prove that the 
population is declining (Thompson et al., this issue). Low 
precision in abundance estimates makes such proof so 
difficult that management actions cannot take place be-
fore populations become severely depleted. Although 
Table 2. Summary of the number of marine mammal stocks by region that were assessed in 1995 by the National Marine Fisheries Services 
under the potential biological removal (PBR) management scheme. 
PBRand rvPBRand No PBRbut Total 
Region Stocks mortality a mortality/) no mortalityc assessedd Source 
Alaska 35 20 0 7 27 Small & DeMaster 1995; NMFS 1995 
Atlantic 62 40 8 5 53 Blaylock et al. 1995; NMFS 1995 
Pacific 56 29 1 2 32 Barlow et al. 1995a; NMFS 1995 
Total 153 89 9 14 112 
a Number of stocks for which PER and total human-caused mortality were calculated. 
b Number (f stocks for which PER was not calculated butfor which an approximate PER level was available along with a calculation (f total 
human-caused mortality. 
C Number (f stocks for which no PER was calculated but,l()r which there was no known human-caused mortality. 
d Sum of the previous three categories. 
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there is the potential of either shifting the burden of 
proof or reducing the level of proof needed to show a 
decline (raising the C\' level), there is still the problem of 
interpreting the cause of the decline and whether the de-
cline is acceptable or not. Consider, for example, a dem-
onstrated decline of 40%. Even if a 40% decline was con-
sidered acceptable, as it would be under the PBR 
scheme, biologists would still need to determine 
whether the decline was likely to continue and what 
part of that decline, if any, was a result of human-caused 
mortality. 
The PBR approach is much more direct because it 
monitors the factor (human-caused mortality) that may 
need management. Rather than waiting until a popula-
tion has been depleted to begin taking action, the PBR 
approach starts reducing mortality when it is apparent 
that current kill levels will lead to depletion. Yet the ap-
proach does require an estimate of kill, which is not an 
easy task. Estimating human-caused mortality is likely to 
be difficult for both marine and terrestrial species. Gath-
ering data is likely to be costly if the mortalities are a re-
sult of low impact by many people. In our case, estimates 
are especially poor for fisheries with large numbers of 
small boats, often operated by one person. Assuring ade-
quate coverage would require a much higher level of 
funding than is currently allocated to this problem. In-
sufficient funding is connected to the second general 
problem: obtaining funding for scrutiny of private enter-
prise is not politically popular. Although the estimation 
procedure is difficult, it is unwise to rely on reports 
from the resource users, and it is clear that management 
cannot succeed without some estimate of the number of 
animals being killed. Some creative thinking about how to 
estimate human kills is desperately needed to understand 
the magnitude of human impact on wild populations. 
The definition of management units has stymied both 
past and current management. Understanding population 
structure is fundamental to any management scheme but 
remains at or beyond our scientific limits. The International 
Whaling Commission uses a precautionary approach by 
deflning "small areas." These areas are created to be so 
small that biologists believe it is not possible to have more 
than one population in that area. Although this approach 
is precautionary and requires only rudimentary knowledge 
of the populations, it is also controversial because no stan-
dard exists to determine when evidence is sufficient to jus-
tify increasing the size of small areas. 
The original PBR guidelines (Barlow et al. 1995b; 
Wade & Angliss 1997) essentially tried to make initial 
management units equivalent to small areas. Scientists 
from different regions, however, did not agree with this 
definition and created their own definitions. Some felt it 
beyond their prerogative as scientists to draw lines on a 
map when data were few to nonexistent. But refusing to 
draw boundaries does not leave the management as "un-
defined" with no kills allowed but rather defines the 
Conservation BiolobTy 
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management unit as the range of the species and puts 
the burden on scientists to prove that population struc-
ture exists before any management actions will be taken. 
The success of this management scheme depends in 
large part on proper definition of stocks or use of FR to 
account for potential biases. If stocks are defined in 
large units, such as the entire Pacific coast, it is likely 
that localized fisheries will never exceed PBR; therefore, 
any management actions needed to preserve the integ-
rity of the range would not occur. Obtaining measures 
of population structure for marine mammals is difficult 
because their aquatic nature limits access for research. 
Requiring proof of structure means at least lengthy de-
lays until management units are adequately defined. In-
deed, requiring such proof may make the new manage-
ment scheme as ineffective as the old scheme for some 
species, because a required parameter is essentially im-
possible to estimate. 
Discussion 
The history of marine mammal management clearly 
demonstrates the need to incorporate uncertainty into 
management models. Simple biological models, which 
did not incorporate uncertainty, resulted in inaction or 
failed management. The model now used to manage ma-
rine mammal populations in the United States is simple 
enough for both the regulators and the regulated to un-
derstand, it relies on parameters that can be estimated, 
and it rewards the reduction in uncertainty with less 
conservative management while allowing management 
actions despite uncertainty. By mandating monitoring of 
both abundance and human-caused mortality, we have 
already greatly increased our general knowledge of ma-
rine mammal populations and identified unsuspected at-
risk species and stocks that otherwise would have been 
missed. 
One of the most positive aspects of the new manage-
ment scheme is separating science from policy through 
the use of performance criteria. Parties on either side of 
management decisions may disagree with the criteria. 
For example, some may want populations to remain at 
higher levels, whereas others may be satisfied with a 
higher chance of not meeting management objectives. 
Neither party, however, is likely to disagree with the es-
timated level of precision of abundance estimates or use 
this uncertainty as a rationale for not taking action until 
uncertainty is removed. 
One of the most argued parts of the model is the de-
fault used for FR' This default was set at 0.5 to account 
for unknown biases based on the results of simulation 
trials. It is difficult to set a value objectively for an un-
known bias. Although quite a large bias (e.g., only one-
half of the kills reported or the abundance estimated as 
Taylor et al. 
twice the true abundance) would be needed before any 
single factor resulted in failure to meet management ob-
jectives, rather small biases in several factors would lead 
to the need for FR = 0.5 to meet management objec-
tives. It is possible to raise FR by presenting evidence 
that biases in abundance, stock structure, growth rate, 
and kills are unlikely or very small. Setting FR = 1.0 al-
lows no room for bias in any of these factors. 
The simplicity of the management model may trouble 
ecologists who are used to models of ecosystems. The 
number of parameters needing estimation for an ecosys-
tem model make such models unlikely to be useful as di-
rect management tools. Indeed, the first 20 years of man-
agement under the MMPA failed because of the inability 
to estimate parameters for a fairly simple model. Although 
the marine mammal management model is simple, it 
seems to gather the baseline data for all species and affect 
management of some fisheries interaction problems. 
There are also marine mammal populations experiencing 
declines that cannot be explained by incidental fisheries 
kills, such as the ongoing decline of Steller sea lions 
(Eumatopias jubatus). More complex biological models 
will continue to help us understand the causes for these 
declines and may eventually result in modifications to the 
management model to address such factors as reduced 
growth rate caused by competition for fish with humans. 
In the meantime, we have a working management 
scheme that addresses one major risk factor for marine 
mammals: direct human-caused mortality. 
Many other terrestrial and marine species are also at 
risk from direct human-caused mortality. For such spe-
cies, a simple management model such as the PBR 
scheme, may allow adequate management despite many 
uncertainties about a particular species. At a minimum, 
managers must have estimates of abundance (and its 
precision) and of human-caused mortality. It is impor-
tant for managers to realize that successful management 
of human-caused mortality must be based on these data 
at a minimum. It is remarkable how few long-term pro-
grams are in place to monitor abundance, yet it is diffi-
cult to imagine a more essential piece of information for 
good management. It is also important for research to be 
dedicated to estimating human-caused mortality because 
history has clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of rely-
ing on reports generated by the potentially affected re-
source users. Carefully chosen defaults can be used for 
parameters concerning maximum population growth 
rate and population structure. The PBR scheme required 
setting quantitative management objectives and has 
yielded a clear measure of performance: PBR versus the 
estimated kill. Reducing human-caused mortality to lev-
els below PBR also gives the concerned parties a clear 
goal around which to organize both further research and 
conservation actions. 
Indirect and direct human-caused mortality pose the 
greatest risks to marine species, and we have directed 
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our management efforts accordingly. Habitat loss may 
pose greater risks for the management of terrestrial spe-
cies. Although the problems may differ, the following 
general lessons from our marine experience apply: (1) 
models must be based on parameters that are easily esti-
mated; (2) uncertainty should be directly incorporated 
not only so management can proceed despite uncer-
tainty but so that management is more conservative the 
greater the uncertainty; and (3) management objectives 
should be quantitatively defined as performance criteria 
to both separate science from policy and allow the man-
agement models to be tuned by means of simulations. 
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